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From a life cycle theory perspective, both young and old individuals may gain from a reallocation of 
equity and wage risk exposure between each other. However, current financial markets do not offer wage 
growth-linked securities and borrowing against labor income without collateral is difficult. To improve 
intergenerational risk reallocation, we propose a market-based voluntary risk trading arrangement 
between coexisting generations via an innovative swap market where participants trade equity-related 
returns for wage-linked returns, and vice versa. The maturity of the swap contract is restricted to one year 
to address the collateral issue. We find there is always a market for equity–wage swaps and the market-
clearing premium will vary depending on multiple state variables (economy, demographics, and human 
and financial capital). This innovative swap market is effective at improving the welfare of all generations 
because the trading of wage-linked returns leads to a more complete market, enabling individuals to 
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Participants of defined-contribution (DC) plans increasingly invest their pension wealth in a default asset 
mix typically composed by professionals from the pension industry. These default strategies increasingly 
reflect the insights of the life cycle investment approach (Viceira 2008), where equity exposure typically 
declines with age to be replaced by less risky or even risk-free assets. Given the uncertainties in one’s 
labor income (and hence one’s human capital), optimal life cycle asset-allocation strategies would 
preferably include wage-linked claims. This strategy cannot be implemented as a default mix, however, 
because of the lack of wage-linked financial assets. This study proposes the innovation of a market-based 
voluntary risk-trading vehicle between coexisting generations for trading equity risk and wage risk, 
potentially enhancing welfare. 
 
Wage-linked benefits have typically been available in funded defined-benefit (DB) pension plans, but in 
the last decades these plans have been on the retreat worldwide. For this plan type, accrued pension rights 
are typically wage-indexed and, after retirement, benefits could be wage-indexed. In many plans, funding 
risks are borne collectively by younger and older participants. The allocation of risk and return over plan 
members is defined by the content of the pension deal. This type of intergenerational risk sharing is 
potentially welfare improving for various reasons (Gollier 2008; Cui et al. 2011), particularly because of 
the implicit offering of wage-linked claims. A main drawback of this framework is that mandatory risk 
sharing between generations may not be maintainable under all circumstances, due to the size of the 
implied redistributive transfers between generations. 
 
Recognizing the potential welfare enhancement of intergenerational risk sharing via pension schemes, this 
study investigates the design of a market-based voluntary risk-trading vehicle between coexisting 
generations. Specifically, we look at the creation of a so-called equity–wage swap (EWS) market, where 
individual pension plan participants voluntarily trade equity exposure and wage exposure at market-
clearing prices. We identify the natural counterparties in such a market, based on the insights from life 
cycle theory. Young individuals with relatively a too-large fraction of personal wealth as human capital 
might be interested in adding more equity exposure to their pension wealth and providing wage-linked 
exposure in exchange, whereas older individuals with a relatively low fraction of wealth in human capital 
might wish to add wage-linked returns to their pension wealth and reduce their financial risk exposure. In 
the current financial market, their wishes cannot be implemented because one (especially the young) 
cannot borrow against their human capital without collateral and because the market is incomplete 
because it does not offer tradable wage-linked securities. However, individuals may find that engaging in 
EWS trading helps them to achieve their optimal exposure in a flexible manner. 
 
We set the maturity of the swap to one year. Every year, individuals can choose how much equity risk and 
wage risk to swap. We solve a life cycle model with multiple cohorts to characterize the optimal exposure 
of all co-existing generations and to find the equilibrium price for the swap. An important driver behind 
the trading and pricing of risk is the ratio of human capital to financial capital. This ratio is state-
dependent and therefore may not be in line with the preferred size. By swapping human and financial 
capital, individuals can restore this ratio toward the preferred size. 
 
This paper builds on and contributes to three fields of literature: on optimal asset allocation over the life 
cycle (Bodie et al. 1994; Cocco et al. 2005; Cui 2009), on innovative securities for pension planning and 
retirement savings (such as longevity-linked securities, Blake and Biffins 2012; wage-linked bonds, de 
Jong 2008a, 2008b; and real annuities, Brown et al. 2001 and van Binsbergen et al. 2013) and, finally, on 
substitutes for intergenerational risk-sharing arrangements (Beetsma and Bucciol 2011; Molenaar and 




In a stylized setting without interim consumption and a labor income stream, de Jong (2008b) derives the 
equilibrium price of wage-linked bonds for an investor optimizing utility on wage-deflated wealth. It is 
shown that investors with relatively low risk aversion and/or a high ratio of human capital to total wealth 
become the issuers (or net suppliers) of wage-linked bonds. Investors with relatively high risk aversion 
and/or a low ratio of human capital to total wealth become the holders (or net demanders) of these wage-
linked bonds. Furthermore, the equilibrium price of wage risk in de Jong’s study is determined from the 
condition that the aggregate demand for wage-linked bonds has to be zero. 
 
In a setting with interim consumption and a labor income stream, however, the optimal demand for wage-
linked assets will be affected. This paper aims to shed light on the demand and supply of the EWS in a 
realistic setting, including a stochastic labor income stream, social security, income tax, and housing and 
medical expenditures for multiple cohorts. We develop a dynamic equilibrium model with multiple 
cohorts to investigate the evolvement of the market size, the market making process, and the market-
clearing (equilibrium) premium. 
 
In our theoretical framework, we find that there is always a market for trading EWSs among co-existing 
generations and that the market-clearing premium from this risk trading may vary, depending on multiple 
state variables (economy, demographics, and human and financial capital). Since the maturity of the swap 
contract is restricted to one year, the collateral issue is easily met in practice. The proposed EWS market 
can be established because 1) EWSs help to complete a missing market of wage-linked claims, 2) EWSs 
help to lift the liquidity (borrowing) constraints of the young, and 3) EWSs help individuals by offering a 
flexible way to realize their preferred exposure to wage risk and equity risk. 
 
The EWS product is flexible regarding who can participate. Natural candidates for organizing the EWS 
market would be the traditional parties involved in assisting individuals in their retirement income 
planning, such as pension funds—which would then function as intermediary and clearing house. 
 
DC plans in many countries are currently growing in size and coverage but are still relatively small, 
compared to DB plans. Many people, especially older generations, are still primarily covered by DB 
plans. This paper therefore serves as a thought experiment for a possible future situation in which DC 
plans become the dominant form of pension plan.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy, the preference structure of 
individuals and the labor income process. After introducing the EWS instrument, we present the 
individuals’ optimal consumption model and the optimal EWS choice framework. Section 3 discusses the 
results in terms of how the market size, the market-clearing (equilibrium) premium and the optimal 
choices of the multiple cohorts over their life cycle evolve. We present the baseline case and four specific 
cases. Analysis of these cases demonstrates the flexibility of the EWS construction, which is able to adapt 
to any given default setting. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Model setup 
 
2.1 Generations and their labor income processes 
 
The economy is populated with investors from different age cohorts, from young (workers) to old 
(retirees), and each cohort is populated with a number of non-identical individuals. We assume that all 
individuals start working at age 25 and retire at 65 and that the maximal obtainable age is 95. The model 
thus consists of 70 age cohorts coexisting at each point in time. In the baseline setup of the paper, we 
assume a stable population. All cohorts are of equal size when entering the labor market at age 25. The 
size of each cohort shrinks over time according to the assumed survival probabilities. In the baseline 
5 
 
result, the survival probability is assumed to be driven by a constant mortality force. Section 3.3 uses the 
projected survival probabilities of the United Nations. 
 
During the working period, individuals earn a stochastic labor income stream, denoted Y. Let t denote the 
calendar year and tx the birth year of individual x, where t - tx is the age (25 ≤ t-tx ≤ 95) of individual x. 
Following Benzoni et al. (2007), we assume that individuals’ real labor income 𝑌𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 = 𝐺𝑡𝑁𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 can be 
decomposed into two components: a stochastic aggregate wage component 𝐺𝑡  and a stochastic age-
dependent idiosyncratic component 𝑁𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 . The growth rate of the aggregate wage component is 
stochastic, determined according to equation (2)
4
 below, where ?̅? and 𝜎𝑔 denote the mean and volatility of 
the annual aggregate wage growth. The idiosyncratic wage component, N, has an age-dependent drift 
𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑡𝑥) = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1(𝑡 − 𝑡𝑥) that generates the hump shape of earnings and log-normally distributed 
permanent shocks. The idiosyncratic wage rate shocks 𝜂𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥  follow the standard normal distribution, 
which generates idiosyncratic permanent income shocks. The real labor income process is thus specified 
as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 = 𝐺𝑡𝑁𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥                                                                            (1) 
𝑅𝑡
𝐺 = ln(𝐺𝑡 𝐺𝑡−1⁄ ) = ?̅? + 𝜎𝑔𝜖𝑔,𝑡                                                    (2) 
ln 𝑁𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 = ln 𝑁𝑡−1,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 + 𝑓(𝑡 − 𝑡𝑥) + 𝜎𝑛𝜂𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥    (3) 
 
In the baseline model, we assume ?̅? = 0.8% and 𝜎𝑔 = 4% per year. The starting annual salary at age 25, 
𝑌25, is normalized to $20,000. The parameters 𝑎0 and 𝑎1 are set according to the calibration of Cocco et 
al. (2005) for the high-education group (𝑎0=$ 0.066 and 𝑎1= -0.0024)
5
 and 𝜎𝑛 = 8%, assumptions that are 
also adopted in the literature (e.g., Benzoni et al. 2007). 
 
After retirement, individuals receive a social security benefit financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Social 
security benefits at age 65, S, are assumed to be a fraction s of the final labor income, that is, 𝑆 = 𝑠 ∗
𝑌65,𝑥. Each year, social security is indexed with the aggregate wage growth. In the baseline model, we 
consider s = 30%. The social security contribution rate (about 20%) is included in the income tax rate for 
employees. 
 
During the retirement period, individuals consume their accumulated wealth, denoted Wt,x, and social 
security benefits. Upon death, any remaining wealth in the DC plan is paid out to the individual’s 
beneficiary, since there is little consensus in the literature on the strength of pure bequest motives; 
furthermore, we assume in this paper that all bequests are accidental. 
 
2.2 Financial markets 
 
Two financial assets are traded in the financial markets, one risk-free and one risky (both in real terms). 
The real risk-free asset offers a fixed real interest rate r. The real price of the risky stock index, 𝐸𝑡 , 
follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift. Dividends are reinvested. The uncertain stock 
                                                          
4 Aggregate wage growth and equity returns are cointegrated by Benzoni et al. (2007); asset allocation to equities may thus be 
reduced due to the cointegration effect. Given this paper’s focus on the trading and pricing of EWSs with a one-year horizon, we 
assume that aggregate wage rates and equity returns are correlated but not cointegrated.  
5
 Our main results for the EWS premium remain very similar for other income profiles. Therefore, only the results based on the 
high-education group are shown in this paper. 
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returns are potentially correlated with stochastic aggregate wage growth. The stock return and wage 
growth-rate dynamics are as follows: 
𝑅𝑡
𝐸 = ln(𝐸𝑡 𝐸𝑡−1⁄ ) = 𝜇 + 𝜎𝐸𝜖𝐸,𝑡 
 
where 𝜇 and 𝜎𝐸 are the mean and volatility of annual stock returns. In the baseline model, we assume r = 
2%, 𝜇 = 5%, and 𝜎𝐸 = 15%, annualized.
6
 Furthermore, we set the correlation between stock return growth 
𝑅𝑡
𝐸 and aggregated wage growth (𝑅𝑡
𝐺 in equation (2)) at 0.2. 
 
 
2.3 The equity-wage swap 
 
In the current financial market, standalone wage-linked securities are not available. Wage inflation-
indexed social security and traditional DB pensions can be interpreted as implicit wage-linked assets, but 
they are not tradable and tend to disappear due to the ongoing shift from DB to DC pension schemes. This 
paper examines the potential innovation of tradable wage-linked securities, namely, EWSs. 
 
The maturity of the swap is one year, which provides maximal flexibility to adapt a preferred position in 
the swap on a yearly base.
7
 Every year, individuals can choose how much equity risk and wage risk to 
swap. Suppose L is the principal or the face amount of the swap. The swap agreement is reached at time t 
between two counterparties, with party A willing to supply wage exposure 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐺  and to demand equity 
exposure at 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸  from party B. Figure 1 displays the cash flows involved in the swap. The initial capital 
outlay is zero by construction. At time t + 1, the payoff for party B (the wage leg receiver) is L(1 + 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐺 ). 
For party A (the equity leg receiver), the payoff can be rewritten as L(1 + 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸 − 𝑚𝑡), where 𝑚𝑡 is the 
market-clearing premium determined by the total supply and demand of such EWSs by all participants. 
The dynamics of this premium are discussed in more detail in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. The net cash flow for 
party A at time t + 1 is therefore L(𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸  - 𝑅𝑡+1




Figure 1: Indirect equity-wage swap (illustrative). 
 
EWSs may have several potential advantages. First, they can help individuals to realize their preferred 
allocation of risk exposure over a lifetime. The old can acquire wage growth exposure without a labor 
income contract. The young can obtain equity exposure without physically holding stocks. Since the swap 
requires zero initial capital from the swap-holders, the swap lifts part of the borrowing constraint of 
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 Given these parameter assumptions, a myopic investor with a risk aversion of three, would optimally allocate 44% in equities 
and 56% in risk-free assets.  
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younger workers. Second, EWSs are traded among parties based on voluntary participation, with risk 
exposure traded at transparent market fair prices. These features of the equity swap market can be seen as 
an improvement to a traditional DB plan, with its implicit premiums and mandatory sharing of risks 
among plan participants. 
 
2.4 Investor preferences  
 
Individuals derive utility over consumption, denoted 𝐶𝑡,𝑡𝑥 . The preferences of each individual are 






 95𝑡−𝑡𝑥=25 ], 
 
where 𝛾  is the risk-aversion parameter, 𝛽  is the subjective discount factor, and 𝑝𝑡−𝑡𝑥  is the survival 
probability from age 25 up to age 𝑡 − 𝑡𝑥. In the baseline case, we opt for 𝛾 = 3 and 𝛽 = 0.97, following 
the classical life cycle literature (e.g., Cocco et al. 2005). 
 
 
2.5 Investors’ optimal choice problem  
 
Throughout their life cycle, individuals make optimal choices regarding their consumption and hence 
savings. During the working period, all individuals optimally save a portion of labor income to finance 
their retirement consumption and then consume the rest of their labor income. We further assume that 
individuals save for retirement consumption via a DC pension plan with a default asset mix
8
 in which 
risky assets comprise a fraction 𝛼𝐷𝐶 and risk-free assets assume a fraction (1 - 𝛼𝐷𝐶). The default equity 
exposure can be either constant or age-dependent (𝛼𝑡−𝑡𝑥
𝐷𝐶 ). The EWS enlarges the investment universe 
with wage-growth risk exposure. In this paper we assume that individuals do not change the default asset 
mix in the DC plan and only change risk exposure to equity and wage growth by taking EWS positions. 
 
Formally, individuals optimize expected utility by choosing optimal consumption 𝐶𝑡,𝑡𝑥 and the optimal 
position 𝐾𝑡,𝑡𝑥 in the EWS each year. A positive position (K > 0) means adding (long) equity exposure and 
reducing (short) wage exposure, whereas a negative position (K < 0) implies reducing equity exposure 
and adding wage exposure. Naturally, a zero position (K = 0) means not participating in the swap market. 
 
The market-clearing condition pins down the fair premium m. Let the variable 𝐾𝑡,𝑡𝑥[𝑚𝑡] denote individual 
x’s choice of the optimal notional amount of EWS at time t, for a given premium 𝑚𝑡. The optimization 
problem of each individual is as follows: 
max
{C𝑡,𝑡𝑥 ,K𝑡,𝑡𝑥[mt]}









The budget constraint of the individual, with 𝑊𝑡 standing for wealth at the end of each period, is 
𝑊25+𝑡𝑥,𝑡𝑥 = 𝑌25+𝑡𝑥,𝑡𝑥 
𝑊𝑡+1,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 = (𝑊𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 − 𝐶𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥)(𝛼
𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑡+1




𝐺 − 𝑚𝑡 ) + 𝑌𝑡+1,𝑡𝑥 
 
 
                                                          
8
 We assume that individuals do not have other sources of wealth apart from their pension savings. 
8 
 
We impose 0 ≤ 𝛼𝐷𝐶 ≤ 1 in order to address borrowing and short-selling constraints. Furthermore, we 
impose liquidity constraints, so that cash on-hand must be non-negative, 𝑊𝑡,𝑡𝑥 − 𝐶𝑡,𝑡𝑥 ≥ 0, and the EWS 
notional cannot exceed cash on-hand, |𝐾𝑡,𝑡𝑥| < 𝑊𝑡,𝑡𝑥 − 𝐶𝑡,𝑡𝑥. 
 
 
2.6 Market-clearing and equilibrium pricing 
 
To pin down the equilibrium premium m, the process of market clearing and price setting is executed in 
two steps. First, individuals reveal their preferred supply and demand for a range of possible premiums. 
The information is then aggregated to set the premium at the market-clearing level of the EWS premium 
𝑚𝑡







The demographic structure thus has an impact on the market-clearing outcome. In sections 3.1-3.3 we 
assume a static demographic structure, and in section 3.4 we apply a changing demographic structure 
because of aging. 
 
 
2.7 Solution method 
 
We generate a set of 6000 scenarios based on the assumptions defined in sections 2.1 and 2.2. Then we 
implement the dynamic programming method using simulations. To do so, we define two new variables, 
investable wealth, 𝐴𝑡,𝑡𝑥 , with 𝐴𝑡,𝑡𝑥 = 𝑊𝑡,𝑡𝑥 − 𝐶𝑡,𝑡𝑥 , and 𝛼𝑡,𝑡𝑥
𝐾 , the portfolio weight of EWS relative to 
investable wealth, with 𝛼𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥
𝐾 = 𝐾𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 𝐴𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥⁄ . We can rewrite the budget constraint as 
𝑊𝑡+1,𝑡𝑥 = 𝐴𝑡,𝑡𝑥[(𝛼
𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑡+1





𝐺 − 𝑚𝑡 )] + 𝑌𝑡+1,𝑡𝑥 
 
We build on the dynamic programming technique (developed by Carroll 2006, and extended by Cui 2009) 
to solve the optimal consumption policy and the investment policy 𝐾𝑡,𝑡𝑥[𝑚𝑡]. That is, individuals’ supply 
and demand are determined by first-order conditions with regard to consumption and notional swap size 
for a given wealth level and any given EWS premium at any time t. The first-order condition is expressed 
in the form of a conditional expectation that includes not only future equity and wage growth 
uncertainties, but also future EWS premiums. Since future EWS premiums are not known at time t, 
investor decisions are based on prior distributions of future EWS premiums. This solution technique is 
inspired by the method proposed by Gomes and Michaelides (2008) for computing equilibrium factor 
returns. The details of the solution steps are discussed in the Appendix.  
 
By using this dynamic programming method, we ensure that individuals’ choices in each step are optimal 
and that undesirable income states are avoided endogenously. In fact, the dynamic programming 
technique operationalizes the principle of “begin with the end in mind,” which is a very good principle for 
retirement planning. The technique of defining retirement saving objectives and working backward to 
achieve them with high probability is strongly recommended by several scholars (cf. Merton 2010; Blake 







There are three key questions that we want to investigate. First, will the market for EWS exist, so that 
some individuals indeed have an incentive to take the equity-linked leg and other individuals, as the 
counterpart, have an incentive to take the wage-linked leg, such that the market clears? Second, how large 
could the market be, in terms of open interest? Finally, what level of premium is required in equilibrium? 
 
We find that these quantities are driven by four important factors: first, the preferences of the individual 
over the life cycle and the assumed economy, both of which were specified in the previous section; 
second, the path-dependent history of the individual as reflected by the ratio of human capital to financial 
capital; third, the default asset mix provided by the pension fund, either a constant mix or a life cycle mix; 
and, fourth, the evolution of the demographic structure, either stable or aging. Obviously, these factors 
will affect the EWS positions that individuals choose. The construction of an EWS is so flexible that it 
can be adapted to any given default setting or demographic structure. 
 
This section first addresses the question of whether the EWS market comes alive at all. We find a positive 
answer for the baseline case, and then evaluate alternative settings. In particular, we address the impact of 
alternatives for the default asset mix, for the risk preference and the demographic structure, and for a 
higher correlation between equity and wage growth rates. 
 
 
3.1 Would the EWS market come alive and why? 
 
We evaluate the demand, supply and resulting market-clearing prices of EWSs for a default asset mix 
consisting of 44% risky assets and 56% risk-free assets. The population is assumed to be stable, so that 
the demographic structure (i.e. cohort sizes) remains constant over time. All cohorts are of equal size 
when entering the labor market at age 25. The size of the cohorts shrinks over time according to survival 
probabilities. Section 3.4 discusses the impact of changing demographic structure due to the longevity 
trend on the demand of EWSs. 
 
Let us imagine that the swap vehicle is available at a certain price. Do individuals have an incentive to 
take a position, either long or short, in this market? Figure 2 depicts the optimal EWS choice at different 
ages, expressed in terms of 𝛼𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥
𝐾 = 𝐾𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥 𝐴𝑡,𝑡𝑥,𝑥⁄  when the premium m varies from -100 basis points 
(bps) to 300 bps (see the legend of Figure 2). The four panels show the optimal choice for four different 
ages (30 years, 50 years, 65 years and 85 years). Each panel lists the level of financial wealth in units of 
labor income along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis shows the optimal weight of the swap in the 
individuals’ portfolios. A positive weight means that the individual would like to increase equity exposure 
in exchange for wage growth exposure. The panels indicate that younger individuals overall prefer a 
positive position in EWSs, whereas the elderly tend to opt for a negative position, indicating that they 
prefer to add wage growth exposure to their financial capital. 
 
We recall that an EWS is an exchange between future wage growth 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐺    and future equity return minus 
the premium 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸 − 𝑚𝑡 ; the payoff of the swap is thus 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸 − 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑊 − 𝑚𝑡 . Note that the higher the 
premium, the less attractive it is to demand extra equity exposure (and hence the lower the preferred 






Figure 2: The optimal policy function of EWS weights for four specific age cohorts for different premium 
levels (m) and different levels of investable wealth (A) in a setting with a constant default asset mix of the 
DC plan. The x-axis shows investable wealth normalized to labor income (A/Y); the y-axis shows the 




Now we return to our key questions: Will the market find an equilibrium, and for what level of the 
premium m? Figures 3 and 4 show the evolvement of the premium level and the EWS market’s size over 
the entire simulated 70-year horizon displayed along the x-axis. When the EWS market starts up, all 
cohorts initially hold their capital in the same default asset mix, consisting of the risk-free assets and the 
risky investment. They all will experience a mismatch with their preferred asset mix, which will vary with 
age. 
 
Figure 3 displays the movement in the market-clearing price over time. The initial value of the premium 
is larger than its longer run value. This suggests that the initial mismatch of the default mix with the 
preferred one is relatively larger for the younger cohorts than for the older ones. The young are willing to 
pay a large m in order to get more equity risk exposure. The expected return of the long position in the 
swap is in any period t equal to: 𝐸[𝑅𝐸 ] − (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 ). A higher value of m will lead to a lower but 
still-positive expected return on a long position. The elderly choose to have a short position in the swap, 
as they are willing to accept low-yielding wage growth exposure in exchange for high-risk equity 
exposure. After the initialization of the swap market, a process of capital transfers from older to younger 
cohorts will take place. As time elapses, more and more workers have been able to acquire additional 
capital via their swap positions, and the additional financial capital helps them to get a higher equity risk 
exposure vis-à-vis the remaining human capital. It takes time before the aggregate human capital risk 
exposure and the aggregate equity exposure are adjusted toward a more optimal situation by cohorts who 
have had the opportunity to participate in the EWS market after entering the labor market. Actually, the 
adjustment period encompasses 40 years, after which all working cohorts have had the opportunity to 
11 
 
participate in the EWS market. Initial economic conditions will have an impact on the specific path by 
which the economy finds the new equilibrium. 
 
Figure 4 indicates the market size relative to total wealth accumulated in the economy of all coexisting 
cohorts. We see that the relative market size initially amounts to 10–12% of the accumulated capital, but 
gradually stabilizes at 5–8%. This informs us about the gradual evolvement of the size of the swap 
market. Initially, the financial capital only consists of investments in the risk-free asset and the risky 
equity. After the introduction of the EWS instrument, capital is redistributed from the old to the young, 
and this shift of capital enables the full span of cohorts to realize a more preferred exposure to risks. The 
EWS market helps the elderly to have exposure to wage growth; in turn, they accept a lower capital 




Figure 3: The 5%-, 50%- and 95% quantiles of the market-clearing premium (in %) over the simulated 
70-year horizon in a setting with a constant default asset mix in the DC plan. 
 
 
Figure 4: The 5%, 50% and 95% EWS market size quantiles relative to the total accumulated wealth of 





Figure 5: The 5%, 50% and 95% quantile distribution of the EWS portfolio weights (𝛼𝑡
𝐾) of entry cohorts 
over a lifetime in a setting with a constant asset default mix. 
 
 
Next, we would like to check how optimal positions taken by individuals in the EWS change over the life 
cycle. This is shown in Figure 5, where we look for the entry 0 cohort in the quantiles of the portfolio 
weights in the EWSs. Note that the optimal weights start at 100% and gradually decrease to -17%, on 
average, in the retirement period. This cohort typically has a long position in the EWS until about age 
50— and then a short position in the EWS after age 50. This is understandable, since the choice of EWS 
depends on available investable wealth and the remaining investment horizon. 
 
Trading in EWSs over the life cycle has an important impact on investor wealth accumulation. Figure 6a 
compares the quantile distribution of the wealth accumulated with (𝐴𝐸𝑊𝑆) and without a trading EWS 
(𝐴𝑛𝑜𝐸𝑊𝑆 ) for the entry cohort (age 25). For greater visibility, Figure 6b shows the relative difference of 
the two, (𝐴𝐸𝑊𝑆 − 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝐸𝑊𝑆)/𝐴𝑛𝑜𝐸𝑊𝑆. We make two outstanding observations. First, when equity performs 
well, the typical investor gets more upside (wealth increases by 15%) when young, and giving away some 
of the upside (wealth decreases by 10%) when old. However, when the equity market performs poorly, 
the older investor will get protection from the future young (wealth increases by 10–15%). Second, the 
median wealth level is 2–5% higher with trading in EWSs than without. The entry cohort thus has, on 
average, more wealth available for consumption, benefiting from improved risk exposure over the life 
cycle, the equity risk premium, and less-restrictive liquidity constraints (or borrowing constraints). 
 
The ultimate motivation for trading in the swap market is to improve one’s consumption profile over the 
life cycle. Figures 6c and 6d report on the distribution of the consumption paths for the now 25-year-old 
cohort with and without the possibility of being engaged in the swap market. We observe that during the 
accumulation phase, the new consumption profile becomes higher for all quantiles. This higher 
consumption can also be observed in the first years of the decumulation phase. Later in retirement, the 
median of the new profile is close to that of the old situation. However, one may observe a smaller spread 
around the median: especially the worst-case consumption (5% quantile) is better in the new situation. 
These changes in the consumption profiles are due to the re-allocation of equity and wage-growth risk 
over the life cycle via the EWS trading. The higher consumption and lower spreading are also observed 




Figures 7a and 7b show the impact of EWS trading on wealth accumulation for the 60-year-olds at time 0. 
Figure 7a compares the quantile distribution of the wealth accumulated with and without trading EWSs 
for the cohort of age 60 at time 0. Figure 7b shows the relative difference between the two. We see that, 
when EWS is available, the investor has more protection (up to 10%) when equity performs poorly, but 
gives away some of the upside when equity performs well. On average, the current elderly have less 
wealth (up to 5%) accumulated due to their position in the EWS trade. 
 
Figure 6a: The 5%, 50% and 95% quantile distribution of wealth accumulated with (𝐴𝐸𝑊𝑆) and without 
EWS trading (𝐴𝑛𝑜𝐸𝑊𝑆) for the entry cohort (age 25). 
 
 
Figure 6b: The relative difference between the quantile distributions of wealth accumulated with and 






Figure 6c: The 5%, 50% and 95% quantile distribution of consumption with (𝐶𝐸𝑊𝑆) and without EWS 
trading (𝐶𝑛𝑜𝐸𝑊𝑆) for the entry cohort (age 25). 
 
Figure 6d: The difference between the quantile distributions of wealth accumulated with and without 
EWS trading, (𝐶𝐸𝑊𝑆 − 𝐶𝑛𝑜𝐸𝑊𝑆) , for the entry cohort (age 25). 
 
  



































Figure 7a: The 5%, 50% and 95% quantile distribution of wealth accumulated with and without EWS 
trading for the initial 60-year-old cohort. 
 
 
Figure 7b: The relative difference between the quantile distributions of wealth accumulated with and 
without EWS trading, (𝐴𝐸𝑊𝑆 − 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝐸𝑊𝑆)/𝐴𝑛𝑜𝐸𝑊𝑆 , for the initial 60-year-old cohort. 
 
 
The main results of the baseline variant are summarized in Table 1 in the row for the baseline case. We 
start by reporting the risk-aversion parameter 𝛾 and the default asset mix 𝛼𝑡
𝐷𝐶, consisting of 44% equity 
for all ages. We then document the main results regarding the median market size of the EWS market as a 
percentage of total wealth and the median premium m, both after 70 years. The 𝛼85
𝐾  column reflects the 
median choice of an 85-year-old regarding his or her position in the EWS. The term 𝛼85
𝐾  is equal to -12%, 
indicating that this person is short in stocks and long in wage growth. Figure 5 provides full information 
on the distribution of the preferred positions in the market by all cohorts. Finally, we show for this case 













𝐷𝐶 Market size 𝛼85
𝐾  m 𝐸[𝑅
𝐸 ] − (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 ) 
Baseline 3 44% 6.5% -12% 2.4% 1.8% 
 




3.2 Impact of changes in the default asset mix 
 
We consider two alternatives for the constant default mix, 60% and 27% equity, respectively, instead of 
the 44% used in the baseline case. In line with what one might expect, the step toward a riskier asset mix 
will lead to a lower m, increasing the payoff for those with a long position in the swap (i.e., the young) 
and decreasing for those with a short position (i.e., the elderly). This can be explained as follows. 
Individuals can adjust their exposure to equity and wage growth only by changing their positions in the 
swap contract. Adjustment of the default asset mix from 44% to the risky 60% mix implies that the 
elderly are farther away from their preferred stake in equities. They are more willing to accept a lower 
expected return from the swap (i.e., (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 ) − 𝐸[𝑅
𝐸 ]), in order to move toward their preferred 
position. This will imply a market process toward a lower m, all else being equal. Younger cohorts, on the 
other hand, are less willing to sell wage-growth risk in exchange for equity-risk exposure, since the 
default asset mix is closer to their preferred one. So they require a higher net return in taking over equity-
risk exposure (i.e., 𝐸[𝑅𝐸 ] − (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 )), which also leads to a market adjustment process to a lower 
m. Thus, the reset of the default asset mix to a riskier one will find a new equilibrium at a lower m. The 
expected payoff of the swap increases from 1.8% to 2.5%. The process toward a new equilibrium leads to 
higher activity in the swap market, since the market size ultimately increases from 6.5% to 8%. The 
variable 𝛼85
𝐾  column, the average EWS position of the 85-year-old, is higher in absolute terms than in the 
baseline case. The elderly need a larger stake in the swap market to offset the increased default exposure 
in equities, with a larger negative stake in the EWSs. 
 
When the default equity position is reduced to 27%, the opposite results are obtained. Now the elderly are 
closer to their preferred position, which reduces their willingness to trade, whereas the young are more 
willing to pay a higher m to obtain more equity exposure. So both the supply and demand sides push for 
the same outcome of a higher m and a lower relative market size. 
 
 
𝛾 𝛼𝐷𝐶 Market size 𝛼85
𝐾  m 𝐸[𝑅
𝐸 ] − (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 ) 
Baseline 3 44% 6.5% -12% 2.4% 1.8% 
More equity 3 60% 8.0% -18% 1.7% 2.5% 
Less equity 3 27% 4.2% -8% 3.2% 1.0% 
Table 2: Summary observations from comparing the base case with a changing default asset mix (more 
and less equity, respectively) for DC scheme with constant asset mix as default. 
 
The finance literature recommends structuring the default asset mix according to the life cycle approach. 
This paper also incorporates the life cycle default-asset mix, and assesses its impact on the EWS market. 
We evaluate the demand, supply and resulting market-clearing prices of EWSs for participants in a DC 
pension plan with a life cycle (LC) default mix starting at 100% at age 25 and gradually declining to 44% 
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𝐷𝐶 Market size 𝛼85
𝐾  m 𝐸[𝑅
𝐸 ] − (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 ) 
Baseline 
3 44% 6.5% -12% 2.4% 1.8% 
Life cycle  
3 44% 4.0% -6% 2.0% 2.2% 
Table 3: Summary observations from comparing the base case with an alternative DC scheme with life 
cycle asset mix as default. 
 
In comparison with the baseline, the initial asset mix for the younger cohorts is closer to their preference, 
so their willingness to be engaged in the EWS market is lower (and hence they require higher returns to 
attract them to participate in the EWS market, which contributes to a lower m). The resulting market size 
is also lower. Figure 9 shows that the equilibrium EWS premium follows the same course as for the 




Figure 8: The 5%, 50% and 95% quantiles of the EWS market size relative to the total accumulated 
wealth of all coexisting cohorts over time in a setting with a life cycle (LC) default asset mix. 
 
                                                          
9
 Even under an optimal individual DC scheme in the current market setting, there is still a need for EWSs because 





Figure 9: The 5%, 50% and 95% quantiles of the market-clearing premium (%) over the simulated 70-
year horizon in a setting with a life cycle (LC) default-asset mix for a DC plan. 
 
 
Following the entry cohort’s choices over time, Figure 10 shows the chosen life cycle default exposure to 
equity with the blue line and the quantile distribution of their EWS position over a life cycle. The figure 
shows that younger cohorts start with a large positive position in EWSs, which then quickly reduces to 




Figure 10: The optimal EWS position chosen by the entry cohort over a full life cycle. The x-axis displays 





3.3 Risk aversion 
 
Table 4 reports the impact of a higher risk-aversion parameter: specifically, an increase from three to five. 
We consider this sensitivity analysis for three cases: the first two cases for a fixed default mix of 27% 
equity, but with different risk-aversion parameters (three and five, respectively), and the third case for a 
life cycle mix with a share of 100% equity at age 25, linearly declining to 27% by age 65 and remaining 
constant during retirement. 
 
When risk aversion increases, the elderly are less willing to accept equity risk while the relative 
attractiveness of wage growth risk increases. The elderly are thus more inclined to exchange equity risk 
for wage-growth risk, and will therefore accept a lower m to get rid of equity risk. The fall in m is greater 
when the life cycle mix acts as the default mix instead of the fixed default of 27% equity. With the life 
cycle mix, younger participants are closer to the mix preferred by them and so will ask for higher 





𝐷𝐶 Market size 𝛼85
𝐾  m 𝐸[𝑅
𝐸 ] − (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 ) 
In DC scheme with fixed default-asset mix 
Less equity 
3 27% 4.2% -8% 3.2% 1.0% 
Higher risk aversion 
5 27% 4.0% -8% 2.4% 1.8% 
In DC scheme with life cycle default-asset mix 
Life cycle 
3 44% 4.0% -6% 2.0% 2.2% 
Life cycle 
5 27% 3.0% +1% 1.3% 2.9% 
Table 4: Summary observations from comparing the impact of different risk aversion. 
 
 
3.4 The impact of aging 
 
The magnitude of the market-clearing EWS premium also depends on the demographic structure (the 
sizes of various cohorts) of the considered population. In this section, the demographic structure follows 
that of the Dutch population projected by the United Nations in 2010. Figure 11 shows the demographic 
structure in 2010 and 2060 (projected). The 2060 projection includes foreseen improvements in longevity. 
For comparison, the stable demographic structure used so far is added to this figure. In this analysis we 
assume a fixed mix as the default portfolio. 
 
Aging implies that the relative proportion of elderly persons increases over time, whereas the relative 
proportion of the young decreases. This shift in demographic structure means that the relatively small 
younger cohorts will receive more attractive returns from the relatively large elderly cohorts through 
EWS trade. The downward pressure on the EWS premium and the market size after the 20-year horizon 
are shown in Table 5, which indeed shows a reduction in the EWS premium to 2.7% and a reduction in 





Figure 11: The (projected) demographic structure in 2010 and 2060 by the United Nations. The cohort 




𝛾 𝛼𝐷𝐶 Market size 𝛼85
𝐾  m 𝐸[𝑅
𝐸 ] − (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 ) 
Baseline 
3 44% 7.5% -12% 2.85% 1.4% 
Aging 
3 44% 6.5% -12% 2.7% 1.5% 
Table 5: Summary observations from comparing the base case to the case of aging for a 20-year horizon. 
 
 
3.5. Impact of the correlation between equity returns and aggregate wage-growth rates. 
 
When the equity returns and aggregate wage-growth rates are more positively correlated (ρ = 0.4) than the 
baseline assumption (ρ = 0.2), we observe a slightly lower market size and slightly less position-taking in 
the EWS by both younger and older cohorts, but no change in the EWS premium level in the long term. 
Because of the higher correlation between equity and wage-growth returns, all individuals (i.e., both the 
supply- and demand sides of the EWS) clearly reduce their exposure in EWSs without having a strong 
impact on the EWS premium. Table 6 summarizes the key comparisons. 
 
 
𝛾 𝛼𝐷𝐶 Market size 𝛼85
𝐾  M 𝐸[𝑅
𝐸 ] − (𝐸[𝑅𝐺 ] + 𝑚𝑡 ) 
Baseline 3 44% 6.5% -12% 2.4% 1.8% 
Higher 
correlation 3 44% 5.9% -10% 2.4% 1.8% 








An important issue in pension plan design is the search for a more efficient way of allocating and trading 
risk across generations. We propose market-based voluntary risk trading among coexisting generations 
rather than mandatory risk-sharing rules. We find that the proposed EWS market can be established 
between young and old generations, for three reasons: First, the market helps to complete a missing 
market of wage-linked claims; second, it helps to lift the liquidity (borrowing) constraints of the young; 
and third, the EWS market offers individuals a flexible way to realize their preferred exposure to wage- 
and equity risk. This type of swap market is transparent, effective, flexible and fair in improving the 
welfare of both younger and older individuals. We have developed a model to price the EWS traded 
among 70 coexisting cohorts within realistic life cycle settings. We find that there is always a market for 
EWS trading among coexisting generations. The market-clearing premium for EWSs may vary, however, 
depending on multiple state variables (including the state of the economy, demographics and aggregated 
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Appendix: Solution method 
 
 
A.1 Rewriting the optimization problem 
 
Since optimization is from each individual’s point of view, we first simplify the subscript (t, tx, x) to t. 
Then we normalize the consumption and wealth variables by the permanent income 𝑌𝑡 . The normalized 
variables are denoted in small letters throughout; for example, wt = Wt/Yt. Then, we rewrite the 












such that  
𝑤𝑡+1 = (𝑤𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡)[𝛼𝑡𝑅𝑡+1









𝑤𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 > 0 
 
−1 < 𝛼𝑡








The first-order conditions with respect to 𝛼𝑡


















The envelope theorem implies that 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡) = 𝑣
′(𝑤𝑡). Replacing 𝑣
′(𝑤𝑡+1) by 𝑢
′(𝑐𝑡+1) in the first-order 





















∗ [𝑤𝑡+1] denotes the optimal consumption policy at time t + 1, which is already obtained during 
the dynamic program procedure. 
 
Using first-order conditions with respect to 𝛼𝑡





}), namely, the optimal choice of 𝛼𝑡
𝐾∗  for any given investable wealth (𝑤𝑡 −
𝑐𝑡)
(𝑖) and any given EWS premium 𝑚𝑡
(𝑗)
. To implement the numerical grid search, (𝑤𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡)
(𝑖)denotes 
the ith discrete value in a predefined set of grid points for investable wealth and 𝑚𝑡
(𝑗)
denotes the jth 








The numerical implementation of the first-order conditions is inspired by the endogenous gridpoint 
method explained in Carroll, C.D. (2006). Starting from the final period, the optimal consumption policy 
is to consume all the remaining wealth, that is,  c= w. This yields the terminal condition for the backward 
induction procedure: 
 
 Step one: Construct a two-dimensional grid for investable wealth a and the EWS premium m. For 





each investable wealth a and the EWS premium m using the first-order condition as explained in 
A.1. 
 
 Step two: Using the optimal portfolio choice, simulate the portfolio return and subsequently 
simulate the cash-on-hand x of the next period for the given investable wealth a and the EWS 
premium m. 
 
 Step three: Calculate the optimal consumption policy 𝑐∗(𝑎, 𝑚) for the given investable wealth a 
and the EWS premium m using the expression for 𝑢′(𝑐𝑡) as derived in A.1. 
 




A.3 Simulation and market clearing 
 
Simulate the behavior of 70 co-existing age cohorts over 70 years. For each time period, simulate the 
individuals’ behavior for every possible EWS premium m. Then, aggregate the EWS supply and demand 










 where i denotes all the individuals from all co-existing cohorts presented in this market. 
 
